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the Code writers to include a similar proviso in the section establishing car-
riers liability.329 This section, while giving due precedence to federal or state
provisions establishing a more stringent liability,330 also allows for contractual
limitations by assent of the parties where the carrier's rates are dependent on
a value which the shipper has had an opportunity to declare.88 ' If the Law
Revision Commission has correctly devined the rationale of the provision in
section 7-204(2),332 it would seem that the added protection given the bailor
to increase valuation should not have been denied the shipper in section 7-206.
If this is an inconsistency, it is one which has saved the latter section from an
ambiguity appearing in the section defining warehouseman's liability, which
has given rise to a unanimous approval by one warehouseman's group, 38 and
unanimous condemnation by another.334
REMOTENESS OF VESTING AND THE CHARITABLE TRUST
I. INTRODUCTION
From earliest times equity has favored charitable trusts. In one form or
another, the chief, but by no means exclusive, method has been through the
doctrine of cy pres.1 While there are divergent views on the scope of this
doctrine,2 it can be broadly defined as a device, applied exclusively to charitable
329. N.Y.U.C.C. § 7-309.
330. N.Y.U.C.C. § 7-309(1). E.g., N.Y. Pub. Serv. Law § 38; Federal Bills of Lading
Act, 39 Stat. 538 (1916), 49 U.S.C. §§ 81-124 (1958); Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 49
Stat. 1207 (1936), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1958). The provisions of ocean bills
of lading are here prescribed. Liability prior to loading or after discharge may, however,
be abrogated. 49 Stat. 1212 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1307 (1958), but not otherwise. 49 Stat.
1208 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) (1958). The amount of liability may be fixed by contract
above a fixed minimum. 49 Stat. 1210 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 1304(5) (1958).
331. N.Y.U.C.C. § 7-309(2).
332. This provision effects no change in New York law since the carrier, like the ware-
houseman, may limit his liability by contract. National Blouse Corp. v. Felson, 299 N.Y.
612, 86 N.E.2d 177 (1949). Limitations are effective, however, only when a choice of rates
between limited and unlimited liability was afforded. Kilthau v. International Mercantile
Marine Co., 245 N.Y. 361, 157 N.E. 267 (1927). See N.Y.U.C.C. § 1-102(3) which allows
reasonable agreement as to the standard of care.
333. Resolution of the New York State Ass'n of Refrigerated Warehouses, N.Y. Leg.
Doc. No. 65(F), pp. 39-40 (1954).
334. Brochure of American Warehouseman's Ass'n, Merchandise Div., id. at 20-21.
1. The use of the cy pres doctrine has been attributed to the fact that the English
chancery court, originally being ecclesiastical, treated charities favorably and viewed them
as a fictitious person, having the same rights as any cestui que trust, with the added
advantage of being exempt, to a certain degree, from the Rule Against Perpetulties. See
Tudor, Charities, 2-3 (5th ed. 1929). For an analysis of the history and development of
the cy pres doctrine see Fisch, The Cy Pres Doctrine in the United States (1950).
2. Scott describes the cy pres doctrine as embracing "the principle ... [that equity will]
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trusts,8 whereby a court of equity can prevent a trust's failure by applying the
trust proceeds as near as possible to the donor's express intention, when this
intention cannot be fulfilled.4
If property is given in trust to be applied to a particular charitable purpose, and
it is or becomes impossible or impracticable or illegal to carry out the particular
purpose . . . if the settlor manifested a more general intention to devote the
property to charitable purposes, the trust will not fail but the court will direct
the application of the property to some charitable purpose which falls within the
general charitable intention of the settlor.5
It should also be noted that this doctrine, originally intended as a means to
salvage only those charitable trusts which had already vested,6 has through
the years been used to circumvent the "'vice of perpetuity.' ",
It is frequently stated that the Rule Against Perpetuities has no application
to charitable trusts.$ While this proposition contains an element of truth, it is,
unless qualified, both erroneous and misleading. The court in Matter of Roe,10
for example, categorically stated that charitable gifts are within the scope of the
rule against remoteness.
"Charitable donations of a public nature, form no exception to the law against
attempt to save a charitable trust from failure by carrying out the more general purpose
of the testator and carrying out approximately though not exactly his more fpccific
intent. .. ." 4 Scott, Trusts § 399, at 2S24 (2d ed. 1956). Bogert states the doctrine thus:
"[It] is the principle that equity will, when a charity is originally or later becomes im-
possible or impractical of fulfillment, substitute another charitable object which is believed
to approach the original purpose as closely as possible. It is the theory that equity has
the power to mould the charitable trust to meet emergencies." 2A Bogert, Trusts and
Trustees § 431, at 315-16 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Bogert, Trusts].
3. Fisch, The Cy Pres Doctrine in the United States 9 (1950).
4. See, e.g., Md. Ann. Code art. 16, § 196 (1957).
5. Restatement (Second), Trusts § 399 (1959).
6. See generally Fisch, op. cit. supra note 3.
7. Matter of Roe, 2S1 N.Y. 541, 549, 24 N.E.2d 322, 325 (1939).
8. Jones v. Habersham, 107 U.S. 174, 185 (1S82); Russell v. Allen, 107 U.S. 163, 166
(182); Bauer v. Meyers, 244 Fed. 902, 911 (Sth Cir. 1917) (per curiam); Ingraham v.
Ingraham, 169 Ill. 432, 450, 48 N.E. 561, 566 (1S97); Burlington County Trust Co. v. Newv
Jersey Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 12 N.J. Super. 369, 374, 79 A2d
710, 713 (Ch. 1951); American Trust Co. v. Williamson, 22S N.C. 458, 463, 46 S.E.d 104,
108 (1948); Penick v. Bank of Wadesboro, 218 N.C. 6S6, 691, 12 S.E.2d 2-3, 257 (1940).
9. J. Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities § 589 (4th ed. 1942) [hereinafter cited as
Gray, Perpetuities].
10. 281 N.Y. 541, 549, 24 N.E.2d 322, 325 (1939). This case, however, is distinguishable.
Although it involved a charitable gift, the gift was to vest only if the testator's nepbew,
then a missing person, was found within two years. Because of this absolute condition
precedent, the court found that the testator had no general charitable intent. Id. at 543-49,
24 N.E.2d at 325.
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perpetuities; at least while they remain contingent and executory. Estates although
given to charitable uses, must vest within the time prescribed by law.""
The term, Rule Against Perpetuities, may connote either the common-law
rule against remoteness 12 or one of its many statutory modifications."3 It is
well established that charities are exempt from the statutory rules against the
suspension of the power of alienation.' 4 Whether they are exempt from the
common-law rule against remoteness of vesting,' 5 however, depends, in most
jurisdictions, upon some application of the cy pres doctrine.'0
The problem of remoteness of vesting arises where a gift, either outright or
in trust, is made to a nonexistent charitable corporation. 17 Whether a particular
result is desirable or justified remains a question of public policy. However,
in the area of charitable trusts, the theories used to subordinate the Rule
Against Perpetuities to the public policy which encourages private benefaction
have been divergent and often conflicting.
II. THE RULE AGAINST REMOTENESS
What is most commonly referred to as the Rule Against Perpetuities is the
judicially developed doctrine' s that every contingent future interest must vest,
if at all, not later than the end of a period measured by one or more lives
in being at the creation of the interest, plus twenty-one years thereafter. 0
While this common-law rule has been modified by statute,20 the motivating
11. 281 N.Y. at 549, 24 N.E.2d at 325.
12. Potter v. Couch, 141 U.S. 296, 314 (1891). See 1A Bogert, Trusts § 213.
13. 1A Bogert, Trusts § 219.
14. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-261 (1956), Lowell v. Lowell, 29 Ariz. 138, 240 Pac. 280
(1925); Mich. Comp. Laws § 554.351 (1948); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 501.12(2) (1947); N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 36-21 (1950); N.D. Cent. Code § 47-02-27 (1960), Hagen v. Sacrison, 19 N.D.
160, 123 N.W. 518 (1909); S.D. Code § 59.0602 (Supp. 1960). Neither statutory nor
common-law restraints on alienation apply to charities. See Reasoner v. Herman, 191 Ind.
642, 134 N.E. 276 (1922); Odell v. Odell, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 1, 6 (1865). The New York
Statutes (N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 12 and N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 113) which do not
refer to any Rule Against Perpetuities have been construed as exempting charitable trusts
from the rules prohibiting the suspension of the power of alienation. See, e.g., Allen v.
Stevens, 161 N.Y. 122, 55 N.E. 568 (1899).
15. 2 Bogert, Trusts § 343. See also Restatement, Property §§ 396-98 (1944) as to the
application of the rule against remoteness to charities.
16. 6 American Law of Property § 24:38 (Casner ed. 1952) ; Gray, Perpetuities § 608;
4 Scott, Trusts § 401.8.
17. Gray, Perpetuities § 604.
18. E.g., Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug Harbour, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 144 (1830).
See also 2 Bogert, Trusts § 342.
19. Potter v. Couch, 141 U.S. 296, 314 (1891). See also 1A Bogert, Trusts § 213. With
certain exceptions, this form of the Rule Against Perpetuities applies to charitable gifts.
See, e.g., MacKenzie v. Trustees of Presbytery, 67 N.J. Eq. 652, 669, 61 Ati. 1027, 1034
(Ch. 1905).
20. For a discussion of the New York statutory provisions which have recently been
principle has remained unchanged, namely that it is the policy of the law to
keep land in commerce and not to suspend the absolute ownership of property,
both real and personal, beyond unreasonable limits.
At the outset, a basic principle should be emphasized: the rule against
remoteness proscribes only the future vesting of contingent property rights, and
not the present vesting of a right the enjoyment of which is postponed.2 1 The
fact that an existing charity is not to enjoy its presently bestowed interest until
the distant future poses no problem with respect to the rule against remoteness
so long as the interest conferred is not dependent upon a condition which may
not occur within the limits prescribed by the rule. Using this distinction
between present vesting and postponement of enjoyment, courts have, in the
case of nonexisting charities, been keen to discover an immediate vesting in
"charity '23 or in a "charitable purpose."2-4 Through this reasoning,2 the
problem presented by the Rule Against Perpetuities has been obviated.
Other problems arise, however, where the named charity is not in being at
the time the trust is created.2 6 If the organization or incorporation of the
specified charity be viewed as a condition to vesting, any gift must, on its
face, be contingent. Furthermore, if the organization be considered a pre-
requisite to the certainty or ascertainability of the beneficiary, the gift might
run afoul of the rule against remoteness for the reason that the beneficiary need
not be ascertained within the limits of the rule.2 7 Confusion has resulted from
the varying attempts of English and American courts to circumvent, in the
interest of public policy, these often-occurring impediments to charitable
_ifts 28
A. Indefinite Beneficiary
The validity of a private trust, within the rule against remoteness, depends
on whether the beneficiaries of such a trust are ascertainable within the period
amended, see Pasley, The 1960 Amendments to the New York Statutes on Perpetuities and
Powers of Appointment, 45 Cornell L.Q. 679 (1960); Powell, Changes in the New York
Statutes on Perpetuities and Accumulations: A Report and a Proposal, SS Colum. L. Re%.
1196 (195S).
21. Gray, Perpetuities § 591. See also Thomas v. Bryant, 185 Va. 845, 856, 40 S.E2d
437, 492 (1946); In re Dyer, Vict. L.R. 273, 41 Argus L.R. 3S4 (Austl. 1935).
22. 4 Scott, Trusts § 401.S, at 23S2. But see Murphy v. Johnston, 190 Ga. 23, 8 S.E.2d
23 (1940); Matter of Roe, 231 N.Y. 541, 24 N.E.2d 322 (1939); In re Lord Stratheden,
[1894] 3 Ch. 265; Kingham v. Kingham, [iS97] 1 Ir. R. 170 (1896).
23. Franklin v. Hastings, 253 Ill. 46, 50, 97 N.E. 265, 267 (1911); Mayor of Lyons
v. Advocate-General, 1 App. Cas. 91, 113 (P.C. 1376); Mills v. Farmer, 19 Ves. Jr. 483, 4S6,
34 Eng. Rep. 595, 596 (Ch. 1815).
24. In re Davis, [1902] 1 Ch. 876. See also 6 American Law of Property § 24:38.
25. See H. Gray, The History and Development in England of the Cy-Pres Principle in
Charities, 33 B.U.L. Rev. 30, 41 (1953).
26. Gray, Perpetuities § 604.
27. See notes 30-33 infra and accompanying text.
23. See Comment, A Revaluation of Cy Pres, 49 Yale L.J. 303 (1939).
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of the rule. 29 On the other hand, it is the essence of a charitable trust-flowing
from the settlor's general purposes which cannot possibly embrace the actual
individuals to be benefited-that the ultimate beneficiaries remain indefinite
and unascertainable. 3° Nevertheless, a valid "charitable trust can be created
although there is no definite or definitely ascertainable beneficiary designated."31
In fact, it is this very element of indefiniteness which is the distinguishing
element of a charity. 32 Recognizing this necessary uncertainty inherent in
almost every charitable trust, several states have passed statutes providing that
charitable gifts shall not be invalid merely because of the indefiniteness or
uncertainty of the charitable object or beneficiaries. 33 Where, however, the
organization or incorporation of a named charity be considered a condition
precedent to vesting, the problem of remote vesting admits of no such obvious
solution inherent in the nature of a charitable use.
B. The Existence of the Charity as a Condition Precedent to Vesting
In the absence of a method to obviate the problem of remoteness of vesting,
a charitable gift to a future corporation will fail if the existence of the named
charity is a condition precedent to vesting.3 One method used to vitiate the
effect of the Rule Against Perpetuities is to treat the named charitable organiza-
tion simply as a trustee to effect the general charitable intention of the donor.m1
Under this approach, most commonly employed where the settlor directs that
the fund be administered by a corporation not in existence ai the time the
trust is created,38 there can be no valid objection based on remoteness of
vesting because equity will not allow a charitable trust to fail for mere lack
29. A private trust will be declared void if the beneficiaries are not certain and cannot
be ascertained within the period allowed by the rule. Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14
Allen) 539, 550 (1867) (dictum). See also 4 Scott, Trusts § 364. Where a charitable trust
is involved, however, the ultimate beneficiaries need not be ascertained within the rule.
See, e.g., Burrill v. Boardman, 43 N.Y. 254, 260-61 (1871).
30. Russell v. Allen, 107 U.S. 163, 167 (1882). See also Perin v. Carey, 65 U.S. (24
How.) 465 (1860); Vidal v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 126 (1844); Gorce
v. Georgia Indus. Home, 187 Ga. 368, 200 S.E. 684 (1938) (per curiam).
31. Restatement (Second), Trusts § 364. Usually, the beneficiaries are "a class of persons
described in some general language . . . and partaking of a quasi public character." 4
Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 1018, at 2 (5th ed. 1941). (Emphasis omitted.)
32. Russell v. Allen, 107 U.S. at 167.
33. Md. Ann. Code art. 93, § 195 (1957); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 501.12(2) (1947); N.Y.
Pers. Prop. Law § 12(1); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 36-21 (1950); S.D. Code § 59.0602 (Supp. 1960).
34. First Portland Nat'l Bank v. Kaler-Vaill Memorial Home, 155 Me. 50, 151 A.2d 708
(1959); In re Schjaastad Estate, 13 Sask. 114, 119, [1920] 50 D.L.R. 445, 450 (1919).
However, had the court in Schjaastad found a general charitable intent, the gift would have
been upheld. Id. at 119, 50 D.L.R. at 450 (dictum). See also Brown v. Condit, 70 N.J.
Eq. 440, 61 Atl. 1055 (Ch. 1905); In re Mander (1950] Ch. 547.
35. Field v. Drew Theological Seminary, 41 Fed. 371, 374 (C.C.D. Del. 1890).
36. Ibid.
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of a trustee.37 A court will give effect to the trust either by appointing a
trustee38 or by acting, itself, in that capacity and establishing a plan to accom-
plish the purposes of the settlor.39 There is a distinction drawn, though without
practical consequence, between the case of a testator who directs that an
organization be incorporated in the future as administrator of the funds,40
and the one where an outright gift to a future charitable corporation is made.:1
In the latter situation, because of the donor's immediate general charitable
pzrpose, the gift is considered to vest immediately and is thereby upheld. 2
An executory gift to a charity, without a precedent gift to private persons, upon the
organization of a corporation . . . is held valid upon the theory that the general
charitable purpose of the donor being immediate, a court of equity, having the
power from the beginning to execute the charity . . . notwithstanding the fact
that the donor's method may cause delay, will regard the gift as immediate, in-
volving neither postponement nor suspension.4 3
In both instances, however, the formation of the corporation has been regarded
merely as a method of administering the trust rather than the essence of the
gift.4 4 Hence, it was deemed that an immediate gift to charity had been made.4
Where, however, as is most often the case, the settlor has simply failed to
direct that the charity be incorporated within a given number of years, 0 or
is unaware that the charity is nonexistent, 47 the existence of the donee is, at
first glance, a condition precedent to vesting and such a trust on its face
violates the rule. In this situation many courts have attempted to save the
trust by a novel application of the cy pres doctrine.
37. 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 1026, at 37. This equitable doctrine is used when
a gift has been made to a charitable organization which is not in existence. Id. at 40.
38. E.g., Bruere v. Cook, 63 N.J. Eq. 624, 633, 52 Ad. Icoi, 1004 (Ch. 1902).
39. 4 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 1026, at 37-38.
40. Ould v. Washington Hosp. for Foundlings, 95 U.S. 303 (1S77); Inglis v. Trustees of
Sailor's Snug Harbour, 2S U.S. (3 Pet.) 99 (1830); Coit v. Comstock, 51 Conn. 352 (1834).
41. Creech v. Scottish Rite Hosp. for Crippled Children, 211 Ga. 195, 84 S.E.2d 563
(1954); Goree v. Georgia Indus. Home, 187 Ga. 368, 200 S.E. 634 (1938) (per curiam).
42. Matter of Potts, 205 App. Div. 147, 199 N.Y. Supp. 320 (3d Dep't), aff'd mem,
236 N.Y. 658, 142 N.E. 323 (1923).
43. Id. at 152, 199 N.Y. Supp. at 835.
44. Compare Coit v. Comstock, 51 Conn. 352 (1834), with Goree v. Georgia Indus.
Home, 187 Ga. 368, 200 S.E. 684 (1933) (per curiam).
45. Franklin v. Hastings, 253 Ill. 46, 50-51, 97 N.E. 265, 267 (1911).
46. See Russell v. Allen, 107 U.S. 163 (1832); Matter of Potts, 205, App. Div. 147, 199
N.. Supp. S0 (3d Dep't), aff'd mem., 236 N.Y. 658, 142 N.E. 323 (1923).
47. Petition of Rochester Trust Co., 94 N.H. 207, 49 A.2d 922 (1946); Cinnaminson
Library Ass'n v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 141 N.J. Eq. 127, 56 A.2d 417 (Ch. 1948);
Jewish Home for the Aged v. Toronto Gen. Trusts Corp., [1961] Can. Sup. Ct. 465, 28
D.L.R.2d 4S (B.C. 1961).
48. See generally Gray, Perpetuities § 603, at 584.
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III. Tn. Cy Pres DOCTRINE
In the view of one of the most eminent authorities on the Rule Against
Perpetuities, charitable trusts which would be void for remoteness can only be
salvaged by a cy pres application.49
If the Court . . can see an intention to make an unconditional gift to charity ...
then the gift will be regarded as immediate, not subject to any condition precedent,
and therefore not within the scope of the Rule against Perpetuities. The mode
pointed out by the testator is only one way . .. of carrying out the charitable
purpose; and if it cannot, with regard to the general charitable intention, be carried
out in that way, it will be carried out cy pres.50
This view is perhaps too broad.0 1
The exact origin of the cy pres doctrine has been obscured by history. 2 The
phrase, itself, is of Norman French origin 3 and signifies literally, "as near as
possible."54 Once the requisites of cy pres are present,r0 a court of equity can
save a gift, which would otherwise fail, by applying it "as near as possible" to
the named charity. 6 The precise advantage of the doctrine is to provide the
courts with a flexible tool to construe charitable trusts in such a way as to
enable them to remain perpetual in the face of circumstances or conflicting
principles of law not contemplated by the testator.57 In those jurisdictions
which do not recognize this doctrine, therefore, it would appear that such
gifts should necessarily fail for remoteness. 8 Nevertheless, even in these juris-
dictions, gifts to nonexistent charities have been upheld, apparently on the
ground that they form an exception to the rule." It is difficult, if not impos-
sible, even to attempt a reconciliation of the reasoning of these cases.
On its face, a gift to a charity not in esse is necessarily contingent, in spite
49. Gray, Perpetuities § 608, at 584-85.
50. Gray, Perpetuities § 607, at 581. (Emphasis added.)
51. See notes 37-45 supra and accompanying text.
52. Fisch, The Cy Pres Doctrine in the United States 3 (1950); see also Gray, op. cit.
supra note 25, at 31.
53. Fisch, op. cit. supra note 52, at 1.
54. Ironmongers' Co. v. Attorney-General, 10 Cl. & F. 908, 922, 8 Eng. Rep. 983, 988
(H.L. 1844).
55. The prerequisites to the application of the cy pres doctrine are three-fold: (1) a
valid charitable trust, (2) impossibility or impracticability of carrying out the donor's
specified purpose, and (3) a general charitable intent. Fisch, op. cit. supra note 52 at 128.
Several states have apparently eliminated the first requirement from their cy pres statutes.
E.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 108-202 (1947); N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 12(2). See also Fisch,
Changing Concepts and Cy Pres, 44 Cornell L.Q. 382, 383 (1959).
56. See note 54 supra.
57. Fisch, op. cit. supra note 52, at 2.
58. Gray, Perpetuities § 608, at 584-85; see also 6 American Law of Property § 24:38.
59. See Graff v. Wallace, 32 F.2d 960, 962 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 579 (1929).
But see Noel v. Olds, 138 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1943), aff'd, 149 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 321 U.S. 773 (1944).
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of any general charitable intent of the donor. It is logically without founda-
tion to find that a general intention dictates an immediate vesting in charity-9
or in that portion of the public intended to be benefited.0 ' Conceptually, how-
ever, where a donor's benevolent intention is absolute and unconditional, many
courts, applying the cy pres doctrine, have found that the gift-to "charity in
the abstract" 0 2--is unconditional and, therefore, not subject to the rule against
remoteness.33 Under this view the specific charity named is treated merely as
the mode of disposition indicated by the donorfr'
Thus, cy pres is used to accomplish two things: first, to apply the trust fund
to an existing charity which carries on work similar to that of the named, but
nonexisting charity specified by the settlor,0 5 and second to find an immediate
vesting in "charity. '0 6 Historically, cy pres was used only to effect the former
result which is within the realm of the classic cy pres power. 7 The latter,
however, appears to be a corruption of the real purpose of cy pres, effecting as
it does, an artificial construction of trust instruments. 9
Where a gift has immediately vested in an existing charitable organization,
and due to some unforeseen circumstances that organization ceases to exist, or
the purpose of the charity is no longer feasible or possible, the doctrine of cy
pres has been utilized to apply the funds to a kindred charity09 Similarly,
60. See Ingraham v. Ingraham, 169 Ill. 432, 458, 48 N.E. 561, 571 (1897); Matter of
Potts, 205 App. Div. 147, 199 N.Y. Supp. SSO (3d Dep't), afi'd mem., 236 N.Y. 658, 142
N.E. 323 (1923); MIlls v. Farmer, 19 Yes. Jr. 483, 34 Eng. Rep. 595 (Ch. 1815).
61. Henderson v. Troy Bank & Trust Co., 250 Ala. 456, 34 So. 2d 835 (1943), aff'd
sub nom. Tumlin v. Troy Bank & Trust Co., 258 Ala. 238, 61 So. 2d 817 (1950); Creech
v. Scottish Rite Hosp. for Crippled Children, 211 Ga. 195, 84 S.E.2d 563 (1954); Crerar
v. Williams, 145 Il. 625, 34 N.E. 467 (1893).
62. Ayor of Lyons v. Advocate-General, 1 App. Cas. 91, 113 (P.C. 1876). See also
Franklin v. Hastings, 253 Ill. 46, 50, 97 N.E. 265, 267 (1911).
63. Ingraham v. Ingraham, 169 111. 432, 451, 48 N.E. 561, 568 (1897); Crerar v. Wil-
liams, 145 Il. 625, 648, 34 N.E. 467, 471 (1S93); Codman v. Brigham, 187 Mass. 3G), 312,
72 N.E. 1003, 1009 (1905). In many instances, a court has merely answered the question
whether or not there is a general charitable intent, without considering the question of
remoteness. Fisher v. Mlinshall, 102 Colo. 154, 78 P.2d 363 (1938) (no general intent);
Goree v. Georgia Indus. Home, 187 Ga. 368, 200 S.E. 634 (1938) (per curiam); First
Portland Nat'l Bank v. Kaler-Vaill Memorial Home, 155 Mle. 50, 151 A.2d 703 (1959)
(void gift) ; Petition of Rochester Trust Co., 94 N.H. 207, 49 Aid 922 (1946) ; Cinnaminson
Library Ass'n v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 141 N.J. Eq. 127, 56 A-2d 417 (Ch. 1948)
(valid gift because general charitable intent present) ; In re Davis, [1902] 1 Ch. 876.
64. Brigham v. Peter Bent Brigham Hosp., 126 Fed. 796 (C.C.D. Mass. 1903); Jewish
Home for the Aged v. Toronto Gen. Trusts Corp., [19611 Can. Sup. CL 465, 28 D.L.R.2d 48
(B.C. 1961).
65. E.g., Petition of Rochester Trust Co., 94 N.H. 207, 49 A.2d 922 (1946).
66. See notes 60 & 62 supra.
67. See H. Gray, The History and Development in England of the Cy-Prs Principle
in Charities, 33 B.U.L. Rev. 30-31 (1953). See also Fisch, op. cit. supra note 52, at 164-66.
68. See, e.g., Brown v. Condit, 70 N.J. Eq. 440, 61 At. 1055 (Ch. 1905).
69. State ex rel. Attorney General v. Van Buren School Dist., 191 Ark. 1096, 89 S.W%.2d
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where the settlor, in the trust instrument, includes a provision or condition
for a charitable disposition which is itself illegal or against public policy, the
doctrine will operate to excise the offending provision. 7° In all such cases,
however, cy pres operates to apply funds which have already vested, or which
would vest but for an illegal provision in the trust, to a kindred charity. In no
instance has cy pres properly operated to change settled principles of law; but
rather the doctrine is applied to change the named beneficiary, where such
beneficiary for reasons of fact or law, is incompetent to take.71 In every
proper case of cy pres the court will only change an impossible beneficiary, or
excise an illegal provision of the trust instrument if it finds that the general
intention of the settlor was charitable. To argue in the first instance that a
general charitable intent necessarily gives rise to an immediate gift to "charity"
in general is unrealistic. Indeed, the concept of a general charitable intent is
itself a legal fiction.
The question is not so much what was the intention [of the testator] ...as what,
in the contemplation of the law must be presumed to have been the intention. 2
IV. THE DOCTRINE IN ENGLAND
Historically, the cy pres power in England has two sources: the so-called
prerogative power which vested in the Crown as parens patriae and judicial cy
pres, exercised by the chancellors. 73 Though the division still exists today, 4
it is "purely vestigial and the results under either doctrine are the same."70
The reasoning used to reach these results, however, was quite different, for
prerogative cy pres was applied without regard to the donor's general charitable
purpose, which was often perverted.76 This twofold origin has had repercus-
sions in this country where the idea of an uncontrolled sovereign power was
alien to American democracy.77
A. General Charitable Intention
The concept of a general charitable intention which has become identified
with the cy pres doctrine did not appear in concrete form until the decision in
605 (1936) (ceased to exist); Society of Cal. Pioneers v. McElroy, 63 Cal. App. 2d 332,
146 P.2d 962 (Dist. Ct. App. 1944); Jackson v. Phillips, 96 Mass. (14 Allen) 539 (1867)
(gift to promote the abolition of slavery applied cy pres for the education of Negroes
after the passage of thirteenth amendment).
70. E.g., Jewish Home for the Aged v. Toronto Gen. Trusts Corp., [19611 Can. Sup.
Ct. 465, 28 D.L.R.2d 48 (B.C. 1961) (illegal accumulation of income).
71. E.g., In re Peterson's Estate, 202 Minn. 31, 277 NA. 529 (1938).
72. Mills v. Farmer, 1 Mer. 55, 79-80, 35 Eng. Rep. 597, 605 (Ch. 1815).
73. See note 28 supra at 303-04.
74. See, e.g., In re Bennett, [1960] 1 Ch. 18 (1959) (gift to nonexistent charity upheld
under the prerogative cy pres).
75. See note 28 supra at 306.
76. See note 28 supra at 305.
77. Fisch, op. cit. supra note 52, at 116.
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Attorney General v. Boultbee,78 where for the first time a court drew the
distinction between the general object of the testator's gift (charity) and the
mode of effecting it27 The full ramifications of this distinction were not crys-
stallized until the monumental decision in Moggridge v. Tlackwell,80 where the
court, reviewing the cases of indefinite gifts to charity, -aid that such bequests
could be sustained only on the theory that the testator had had a general intent
to benefit charity, and had merely neglected to provide the specific mode.8 '
Absent a specified modus operandi, the court could apply the gift cy pres.
While Lord Eldon did not purport to reconcile all the decisions prior to Mog-
gridge, he did lay down a working pattern for future problems 2
With this concept of general charitable intention thus established with respect
to unnamed or indefinite beneficiaries, the principle came to be applied later,
under a misdirected application of the cy pres doctrine, to charitable uses
which would otherwise run afoul of the rule against remoteness of vesting6 3
B. Application to Gifts to Nonexistent Charities
When a court, by the novel employment of the cy pres doctrine determines
that a donor's primary intention is to benefit charity in general, it is imposing
a legal presumption rather than imputing an actual state of mind to the
settlor. 4 A benefactor of charity does not in fact visualize "charity in the
abstract" or the persona of Charity, as the beneficiary.85 Consequently, when
a court finds a general charitable intention even where the donor has denoted
a specific charity as the beneficiary, this construction is tantamount to holding
that the donor's intention was general from the mere fact that it was charitable.
Certainly, it is distorted reasoning which finds any intention to benefit "charity
in the abstract" merely because the named beneficiary is charitable. In many
instances, due to the peculiar predilections of the donor, he might wish to
benefit only a specific charity. This indiscriminate philanthropy attributed to
him by the law is most often without foundation in factOG
Surely, it would be more in accord with reason and consistency simply to
hold the rule against remoteness inapplicable to charitable trusts. Public policy
should be able to justif, an exception to a settled rule of law to fulfill the
needs of society without distorting existing law or offending reason. However
78. 2 Ves. Jr. 380, 30 Eng. Rep. 6S3 (Ch. 1794), aff'd, 3 Yes. Jr. 220, 30 Eng. Rep. 979
(Ch. 1796).
79. Attorney General v. Boultbee, 2 Ves. Jr. at 3S7, 30 Eng. Rep. at 687.
SO. 7 Ves. 36, 32 Eng. Rep. 15 (Ch. 1803), aff'd, 13 Yes. 416, 33 Eng. Rep. 330 (Ch.
1807).
S1. Moggridge v. Thackwell, 7 Ves. at 83, 32 Eng. Rep. at 31.
82. Ibid.
83. Mills v. Farmer, 19 Ves. Jr. 483, 34 Eng. Rep. 595 (Ch. 1815).
84. Brown v. Condit, 70 NJ. Eq. 440, 453, 61 Ad. 1055, 1060 (Ch. 1905).
85. L Gray, The History and Development in England of the Cy-Pres Principle in
Charities, 33 B.U.L. Rev. 30, 41 (1953).
86. See Comment, A Revaluation of Cy Pres, 49 Yale L.J. 303, 321 (1939).
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desirable it is to find a cogent legal basis for saving charities from the rule
against remoteness, the English courts have persisted in this type of reasoning.
Thus, it has become settled law that in the case of the initial failure of the
donor's named object, the gift will not fail entirely if a manifest intention to
benefit charity is present.8 7 In such a situation, the court will formulate a
scheme, making a cy pres application of the funds.88 In Mayor of Lyons v.
Advocate-General,8 9 the court stated the theory thus:
The principle on which the . . . [cy pres] doctrine rests appears to be, that the
Court treats charity in the abstract as the substance of the gift, and the particular
disposition as the mode, so that in the eye of the Court, the gift, notwithstanding
the particular disposition may not be capable of execution, subsists as a legacy which
never fails and cannot lapse.90
No English case has categorically stated that the Rule Against Perpetuities
does not apply to charities.9 ' The leading decision on the subject, Chamberlayne
v. Brockett,92 on the contrary, seems to recognize the theoretical possibility
of a charitable trust which might fail because it violates the rule against
remoteness.
If there was an immediate gift . . . for charitable uses . . . [it was clear upon
the authorities] that such gift was valid . . . although the particular application
of the fund . . . would not of necessity take effect within any assignable limit of
time, and could never take effect at all except on the occurrence of events in their
nature contingent and uncertain. 3
Such a recognition, however, was without practical effect, since the court then
stated that once property is given absolutely to charity (and this depends on a
general charitable intent) it was taken out of the reach of the rule against
remoteness.94
87. Chamberlayne v. Brockett, 8 Ch. App. 206, 212 (1872).
88. In re Songest, [19561 1 Weekly L.R. 897 (CA.); In re Harwood, [1936] 1 Ch.
285 (1935).
89. 1 App. Cas. 91 (P.C. 1876).
90. Id. at 113 (dictum). (Emphasis added.) In Attorney General v. Bishop of Chester,
1 Bro. C.C. 44, 28 Eng. Rep. 1229 (Ch. 1875) where the gift was upheld, the question of
remoteness apparently was not raised, nor was it suggested that the fund left to a non-
existent charity could be applied cy pres. In Sinnett v. Herbert, 7 Ch. App. 232 (1872),
virtually silent on the subject, the Lord Chancellor felt that the decision in Bishop of
Chester was the complete answer to any question of remoteness. However, both these
cases have been explained in the light of a general charitable intention being present. See
In re Schaajstad Estate, 13 Sask. 114, (1920] 50 D.L.R. 445 (1919).
91. Wallis v. Solicitor-General, [1903] A.C. 173, 186 (P.C.).
92. 8 Ch. App. 206 (1872).
93. Id. at 210-11.
94. Id. at 211.
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The more recent decisions are in accord with the policy now firmly entrenched
in English jurisprudence., The courts continue to recognize the rule that
charities are not per se exempt from the Rule Against Perpetuities,°0 but in
almost every case find a general charitable intent (from the mere fact that the
gift is charitable) sufficient to satisfy the requirement of vesting.P7 Today,
as a practical matter, the English theory will not permit a charitable trust
to fail merely because the named donee is nonexistent. Where, however, the
trust is for a definite and special purpose-and therefore there is no general
intent to be inferred-it will succumb to the rule against remoteness if there
is no charity in being capable of taking.Ps
Thus, it can be said that while the English chancery has been content to
recognize the problem of the rule against remoteness by finding an almost
universal exception to it through a peculiar application of cy pres, American
courts have struggled with varying and divergent theories0
V. CHEARITABLE TRuSTS IN THE UIITED STATES
In addition to an aversion to its historical background,10 another factor
which retarded the acceptance in America of charitable trusts, and therefore
necessarily the cy pres doctrine, was the historical error in Trustees of the
Philadelphia Baptist Ass'n v. Hart's Ex'rs.101 There, the Supreme Court er-
roneously concluded that equity's jurisdiction over charitable dispositions was
95. See, e.g., In re Bennett, [1960] Ch. IS (1959); In re Songest, [1956] 1 Weekly L.R.
S97 (CA).
96. Jewish Home for the Aged v. Toronto Gen. Trusts Corp., [1961] Can. Sup. CL at
468-69, 23 D.L.R.2d at 51.
97. Ibid.
98. In re Schjaastad Estate, 13 Sask. 114, [1920] 50 D.LR. 445 (1919).
99. One mode employed to sustain gifts to charitable corporations to be organized in
the future is based on the theory of an executory devise. See Russell v. Allen, 107 U.S.
163 (1882); Ould v. Washington, 95 US. 303 (1S77); Inglis v. Trustees of Sailors Snug
Harbour, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99 (1830); Coit %% Comstock, 51 Conn. 352 (10N). Although
the concept of general charitable intent is frequently alluded to, the theory is in no way,
except to the extent that cy pres has become identified with the law of charitable trusts,
dependent upon that doctrine; rather it has for its basis, the inherent power of equity
to administer charitable trusts. See Matter of Potts, 205 App. Div. 147, 199 N.Y. Supp.
8S0 (3d Dep't 1923). However, an executory devise like any other future interest is subject
to the Rule Against Perpetuities if it imposes no limitation whatever upon the time within
which the future estate shall vest. McMahon v. Consistory of St. Paul's Reformed Church,
196 Md. 125, 75 A.2d 122 (1950). Therefore, executory charitable gifts should, unle3 they
form an exception, be subject to the rule against remoteness.
100. See note 77 supra and accompanying text.
101. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 1 (1319). Accord, Gallego's Ex'rs v. Attorney General, 30 Va.
(3 Leigh) 450 (1832).
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conferred by the English Statute of Charitable Uses.10 2 The Court reasoned
that apart from this statute, which was not in effect in Virginia, the initial
forum, equity had no inherent jurisdiction to enforce charitable trusts.10 Not
until twenty-five years later did the Supreme Court overrule this decision and
hold that equity has this inherent power. 0 4 In spite of this recognition, the
impression left by the Baptist case has never been totally erased. 10 Gradually,
however, the cy pres doctrine gained acceptance and, as in England, whether
a trust would be applied or salvaged under that power depended upon a finding
of a general charitable intent.'10 It has been held, however, that the trust in-
strument, itself, must evidence such purpose. 07 Consequently, evidence of sub-
sequent incorporation of the specified charity was inadmissible on the question
of the settlor's actual intent. 08
Today, many American jurisdictions have adopted the equitable doctrine
of cy pres by express statutory authorization.' 0 In some that have not,
charitable trusts are still upheld, apparently on the basis of equity's inherent
power to enforce charitable dispositions. 10
Remedial legislation has not been an important factor in eliminating the
problem of remoteness. The misconception that the rule against remoteness
does not apply to charities is often attributable to references made to statutes
in several jurisdictions which prohibit the suspension of the power of alienation
beyond specified periods."' Although some of these statutes exempt charitable
102. 17 U.S. at 29.
103. Id. at 27.
104. Vidal v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 126 (1844).
105. Fisch, op. cit. supra note 52, at 12-13.
106. See, e.g., Miller v. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 224 Md. 380, 168 A.2d 184
(1961).
107. First Portland Nat'l Bank v. Kaler-Vaill Memorial Home, 155 Me. 50, 151 A.2d
708 (1959).
108. Id. at 65-66, 151 A.2d at 716-17.
109. Ala. Code tit. 47, § 145 (1958); Ga. Code § 108-202 (1933); Md. Ann. Code art.
16, § 196 (1957); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 501.12(3) (1947); N.Y. Pers. Prop. Law § 12(2);
N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 113(2); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 18-4-1 (1956); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 231.11(7) (1957).
110. See note 59 supra and accompanying text. In Tumlin v. Troy Bank & Trust Co., 258
Ala. 238, 61 So. 2d 817 (1950) a charitable trust was upheld under the doctrine of approx-
imation which is purportedly Alabama's equivalent of cy pres. Id. at 242, 61 So. 2d at 820.
However, one dissenting opinion pointed out that the two doctrines are diverse; the trust
being violative of the Rule Against Perpetuities, it could not be validated by substituting
equitable approximation for the cy pres doctrine. Id. at 256, 61 So. 2d at 834 (Simpson, J.,
dissenting).
111. E.g., N.D. Cent. Code § 47-02-27 (1960). In Hagen v. Sacrison, 19 N.D. 160, 123
N.W. 518 (1909), it was held that charities are not subject to the rule against the sus-
pension of the power of alienation.
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gifts from the Rule Against Perpetuities,"- the exemption has not been con-
strued to extend to the common-law rule against remoteness.113 Thus, a
Michigan statute1 4 has been held merely to exempt charities from the rule
prohibiting the unlawful suspension of the power of alienation. 1"3 Similar legis-
lation is in force in a number of jurisdictions.11 Thus theoretically, the rule
against remoteness could still apply to charities.
Maryland by statute has alleviated the problem to some extent:
No devise or bequest of real or personal property for any charitable uses shall be
deemed or held to be void by reason of any uncertainty vith respect to the donees
thereof... 117
Severe restrictions, however, are imposed on this provision in that the testator
must direct the formation of the corporation in his will.118 A further limitation
is placed on the time within which the corporation may be organized. 110
New York has broadened its cy pres power by additions to an already liberal
statute.'O Previously, a gift in trust to a charitable corporation to be organized
in the future was held valid,'-' while absolute gifts without the interposition
of a trust were often held to lapse. -22 The new provisions, on the other band,
expressly validate outright gifts made to nonexistent charities;2 - and although
the statute is silent on the rule against remoteness, it implicitly exempts
charities.' 2 4 Of course, the statute's application depends upon a general charit-
able intent of the donor."'3
112. See note 14 supra.
113. Lowell v. Lowell, 29 Ariz. 138, 240 Pac. 230 (1925); American Trust Co. v. Wil-
liamson, 228 N.C. 458, 46 S.E.2d 104 (1943); Penick v. Bank of Wadesboro, 218 N.C. 66,
12 S.E.2d 253 (1940). In New York, the Rule Against Perpetuities is directed against both
remoteness of vesting and the suspension of the absolute ownership of property. Matter
of Wilcox, 194 N.Y. 28, 87 N.E. 497 (1909); In re Jarvie's Trust, 73 N.Y.S.2d 246 (Sup.
Ct. 1947); Bankers Trust Co. v. Firth, 177 Misc. 797, 31 N.Y.S.2d S9 (Sup. CL 1941).
114. Mich. Comp. Laws § 554.351 (1943).
115. In re Brown's Estate, 198 Mich. 544, 165 N.W. 929 (1917).
116. See note 14 supra.
117. Md. Ann. Code art. 93, § 357 (1957).
118. Yingling v. Miller, 77 Md. 104, 26 At. 491 (1893).
119. See note 117 supra.
120. In 1953, New York amended Section 113 of the Real Property Law and Section 12
of the Personal Property Law, giving its courts power to prevent the failure of gifts made
to nonexistent donees.
121. Matter of Potts, 205 App. Div. 147, 199 N.Y. Supp. SZO (3d Dep't), afi'd mem.,
236 N.Y. 658, 142 N.E. 323 (1923).
122. Matter of Joseph's Estate, 62 N.YS.2d 197 (Surr. Ct. 1946); Matter of Walker,
185 Misc. 1046, 53 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Surr. Ct. 1944). But see Iatter of Wolf, 7 Misc. 2d
799, 162 N.Y.S.2d 645 (Surr. Ct. 1957); Matter of Dobbins, 205 Misc. 64, 132 N.Y.S.2d
236 (Surr. Ct. 1953).
123. See N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 65(S) (1953).
124. Matter of Sanders, 7 Misc. 2d So, 161 N.Y.S.2d 932 (Surr. CL 1957); In re
Westheimer's Estate, 124 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Surr. CL 1953) (dictum).
125. Matter of Sanders, 7 Misc. 2d 800, 803, 161 N.Y.S.2d 982, 984-35 (Surr. Ct. 1957).
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In Massachusetts and Illinois, the rule that charities are subject to the rule
again remoteness is apparently limited to the situation where there is a prior
gift for a noncharitable intention."2
A gift in trust for a charity not existing at the date of the gift, and the beginning
of whose existence is uncertain, or which is to take effect upon a contingency that
may possibly not happen within . . . [the time allowed by the Rule Against
Perpetuities] is valid provided there is no gift of the property meanwhile to or
for the benefit of any private person or corporation. 127
In Crerar v. Williams,128 a testator left the residue of his estate for the purpose
of erecting a public library and directed that a corporation be formed to carry
out this plan. Despite the fact that the corporation might not have been
chartered within the period prescribed by the rule against remoteness, the
court did not invalidate the gift.-29 Since it was for a general charitable purpose,
the gift was upheld.' 30 A general charitable intent will not, however, be inferred
merely from the fact that the named donee, which ceased to exist before the
gift vested, was engaged in a particular type of charitable work.131 Also, Codman
v. Brigham'- indicates that the rule in these states is not dependent solely on
the cy pres doctrine. Cy pres would be used to save the gift only in the event
that the corporation could not be formed.' 33 A kindred federal decision'1 4
pointed out that under the law of Massachusetts a gift to a nonexistent charity
was valid because the strict Rule Against Perpetuities had been modified to
favor charitable gifts. 135 Where there is an intention to benefit charity generally,
the gift is construed as "immediate" (that is, without any intervening gift)
and merely the mode of enjoyment is postponed.8 6
VI. CONCLUSION
While both English and American courts have exempted charitable disposi-
tions from the rule against remoteness on a unique application of the cy pres
126. Franklin v. Hastings, 253 Ill. 46, 97 N.E. 265 (1911); Ingraham v. Ingraham,
169 Ill. 432, 48 N.E. 561 (1897); Crerar v. Williams, 145 Ill. 625, 34 N.E. 467 (1893);
Codman v. Brigham, 187 Mass. 309, 72 N.E. 1008 (1905); Odell v. Odell, 92 Mass. (10
Allen) 1, 7 (1865) (dictum).
127. Brigham v. Peter Bent Brigham Hosp., 126 Fed. 796, 797 (C.C.D. Mass, 1903).
128. 145 Ill. 625, 34 N.E. 467 (1893).
129. Id. at 648-49, 34 N.E. at 471.
130. Ibid.
131. Quimby v. Quimby, 175 IMI. App. 367, 372-73 (1912).
132. 187 Mass. 309, 72 N.E. 1008 (1905).
133. Id. at 313, 72 N.E. at 1009.
134. See note 127 supra.
135. 126 Fed. at 800.
136. Id. at 798; Franklin v. Hastings, 253 Il1. 46, 50-51, 97 N.E. 265, 267 (1912);
Ingraham v. Ingraham, 169 11. 432, 458, 48 N.E. 561, 566 (1897).
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